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CHAPTER 3 
Work and Welfare: the Rights and Responsibilities of Unemployment in the UK 
Peter Dwyer and Nick Ellison 
Introduction: The New ‘Active’ World of Welfare 
The profound economic, political and social changes of recent years (Cox 1998, Williams 1999, Esping-
Andersen 2002) have led to significant organizational modifications in many Western welfare states 
(Taylor-Gooby 2002). Influenced by the powerful right-wing critique that the availability of extensive 
and largely unconditional social rights has led to the development of a passive, welfare-dependant 
‘underclass’ (Murray 1984; Mead 1986, 1997), policies which aim to ‘activate’ recipients of social 
security and make access to welfare benefits conditional on acceptance of specified work, work search or 
related training responsibilities have become an established part of contemporary welfare reform. 
According to Walters (1997), a fundamental shift has occurred. In the ‘welfare society’ of the past the 
state exempted certain ‘inactive’ individuals from participation in the paid labour market (PLM). This 
was because they were recognized as making socially valid contributions elsewhere (e.g. women engaged 
in informal/familial care work), because they had previously contributed (retired senior citizens) or 
because their inactivity was due to individual impairment or illness. This ‘welfare society’ which, 
theoretically at least, entitled such citizens to a minimum of welfare rights has given way to the ‘active 
society’ in which increasingly individuals can only access social rights if they are willing to become 
workers in the PLM. Today, ‘many of these assumptions about the specifically social obligations and 
consequent rights of the citizen no longer apply … The active society makes us all workers’ (Walters 
1997: 223–4). Proponents of this new active world of welfare believe that passive entitlement to public 
welfare benefits entrenches welfare dependency and that reluctant individuals on welfare should be 
variously encouraged, cajoled and, if necessary, compelled (via the application of benefit sanctions) into 
paid work. 
As Dean et al. (2005) note, in different national locations various terms (welfare-to-work, 
insertion, activation, workfare, active labour market policies), have been used to describe and analyse the 
policies that are at the heart of the shift. Regardless of the language used to describe them, such policies 
are built on two shared assumptions. First, that active labour market policies are a prerequisite for the 
smooth functioning of the globalized market place. Second, although the ways in which activation is 
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operationalized in particular contexts vary considerably (Lødemel and Trickey 2001, Van Berkel and 
Hornemann Møller 2002, Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004, Wright, Kopač and Slater 2004), 
activity in the PLM is now generally deemed a necessary requirement of full citizenship status (Goul 
Andersen and Halvorsen 2002). 
Within the UK these themes have found expression in a ‘Third Way’ politics that has been 
enthusiastically endorsed by the New Labour government (Blair 1998). According to the chief exponent 
of the Third Way, Anthony Giddens (1994, 1998), the new ‘social investment state’, meets its welfare 
commitments via the redistribution of ‘possibilities’ (primarily the opportunity to work and the right to 
education), rather than wealth. Giddens’s assertion that there should be ‘no rights without responsibilities’ 
(Giddens 1998: 65) has also become a central feature of New Labour’s welfare policies in respect of 
unemployed citizens. Increasingly, a principle of conditionality, under which the right to social security 
benefits becomes conditional on individuals accepting that they have a responsibility to enter, or at least 
prepare for future entry, into the PLM, has become an integral part of the UK government’s response to 
unemployment (Dwyer 2002, 2004a, b). In its attempt to fundamentally rework the contract between 
citizen and the state, New Labour has jettisoned ‘the post war ideal of a society based on universal state 
benefits’ (McDowall 2004: 152). This has been replaced by a welfare system that combines coercive 
contractual governance (Freedland and King 2003) with highly conditional entitlements (Dwyer 2004b). 
Subsequent sections of this chapter outline the extent to which a principle of conditionality 
underpins unemployment policy in the UK. Following this introduction, the ways in which conditionality 
is being practically applied to those who are deemed to be inactive and/or excluded from the UK paid 
labour market are highlighted. Policies that relate to three groups – those formally defined as 
unemployed, lone parents and disabled people – are outlined and discussed. It is important to include the 
latter two groups. As New Labour redefines the notion of social security, lone parents and disabled people 
are no longer exempt from conditionality and the compulsion it implies (Hewitt 2002). As the new 
contract for welfare is expanded, they are being reconceptualized as potential workers in need of 
activation (Trickey and Walker 2001, Millar and Ridge 2002, Stanley, Asta Lohde and White 2004). 
Having outlined New Labour’s approach, the next section moves on to locate UK policy developments 
within a wider discussion of the emergence and consolidation of conditionality within other European and 
Western welfare states. The conclusion argues that, as conditionality becomes a foundational principle of 
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social security and unemployed people’s access to welfare benefits become provisional on engagement 
with the PLM, the notion of a right to welfare is systematically undermined. It is also suggested, however, 
that a second and ‘latent’ dimension of conditionality is contained in contemporary activation policies. As 
labour market policies become increasingly ‘individualized’, through personalized work-focused 
interviews, guidance about job opportunities as well as targeted sanctions, individuals are gradually 
induced – or conditioned – to ‘govern themselves’. 
 A New Deal? Unemployment Policy in the UK 
The centrality of paid work within New Labour’s welfare reforms has long been widely acknowledged 
(Deacon 1998, Levitas 1998, Powell 1998). The government has declared ‘that work is the best form of 
welfare’ and introduced a range of measures ‘to make work pay’ and discourage benefit dependency. 
These include positive measures such as a national minimum wage, an extensive system of tapered, 
means-tested tax credits, arrangements for the subsidized provision of childcare and the training and 
educational aspects of the various New Deals discussed below (Bennett 2004, Hewitt 2002, Millar and 
Ridge 2002 for details). Indeed, an element of New Labour’s approach to welfare has been to improve 
certain benefits, for example, child benefit and children’s allowances for those on income 
support/income-related jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) (Lister 2001). A minimum income guarantee of £179 
per week and help with childcare costs for lone parents working 16 hours plus per week are also part of 
the Job Centre Plus initiative (Blair 2002). More negative policy changes for inactive citizens have 
included ending lone parent benefit supplement and the ongoing introduction of stricter eligibility tests 
for disability benefits (Clasen 2002). Furthermore, in order to be eligible for the financial benefits 
available through the tax credits system, poorer citizens are required to be active in the PLM.1
Allied to what may be seen as the government’s attempts to encourage paid work, it is important to 
note the extent to which a principle of conditionality has become an integral element of unemployment 
policy in the UK. The whole-hearted endorsement of this approach by a British Labour government 
would have been unthinkable less than a decade ago, but it is now fundamental to their vision of a twenty-
first-century welfare state (Deacon 2002). The government is not afraid to use a mix of incentive and 
 
                                                 
1 One aspect of New Labour’s policy is out of step with conditionality. Unlike other tax credits that are conditional on 
engaging with paid work, the Child Tax Credit (introduced in April 2003) is intended to enable people to engage in 
paid work by meeting some of the costs of childcare. However, activity in the paid labour market is not required. 
Wright, Kopač and Slater (2004: 524) argue that this represents a ‘social democratic strengthening of social rights for 
people with children’. 
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sanction in order to compel or cajole people into paid work. In seeking to activate those without paid 
work, New Labour is endorsing and extending the approach of its Conservative predecessors (Dwyer 
1998, 2000, Freedland and King 2003, Lindsay and Mailand 2004, Wright, Kopač and Slater 2004). 
Unemployed People 
In launching the national Job Centre Plus initiative, the Prime Minister stressed three elements in the 
government’s strategy for reducing dependency on social welfare benefits. 
The first is Job Centre Plus; the second to extend the concept of the New 
Deals and rights and responsibilities beyond the unemployed to the sick and 
disabled (sic). The third part is new opportunities for skilled jobs (Blair 2002: 
6). 
The national Job Centre Plus initiative launched in April 2002 retains the rationale and extends the 
reach of the ‘One’ initiative that it replaced (Hewitt 2002). Anyone claiming working-age benefits must 
agree to take part in a work-focused interview with an assigned adviser as a condition of benefit 
eligibility. The list of benefits that this measure covers is extensive and includes jobseeker’s allowance, 
income support, incapacity benefit, maternity allowance, bereavement benefits, industrial injuries 
disablement benefit, care allowance and the social fund (Treolar 2001). 
Within the existing ‘New Deals’ for the young and long-term unemployed, the link between rights 
and responsibilities has been clearly defined since 1997. Failure to take up one of the four work/training 
options offered (i.e. a subsidized job with a participant employer, work in the voluntary sector, a place on 
an environmental task force or approved full-time education/training) results in punitive benefit sanctions. 
A fifth option, of a passive right to benefit, has long since been removed. Claimants can lose some or all 
of their benefit for a period of between 2 and 26 weeks depending on circumstances. Detailed data on 
those affected by cuts and suspensions to benefits indicate that in quarter-yearly periods between 
October/December 1998 and July/September 2000 the numbers of young people sanctioned varied 
between a low of 2695 and a high of 5157 (Bivand 2001). Government figures relating to JSA also show 
some 21,000 claimants as subject to sanctions in May 2002 (DWP 2002). 
Two other policy initiatives focused on JSA recipients are also worth considering. In December 
2000 the Secretary of State for Education outlined the need for a ‘radical and imaginative strategy’ to 
tackle the problem of adult illiteracy in the UK, which he identified as a significant cause of exclusion 
from the PLM, decent jobs and wider community networks (Blunkett 2000). In setting a target to reduce 
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the number of adults with very weak numeracy/literacy skills by three-quarters of a million people by 
2004, Blunkett announced a series of pilot projects across England to begin in March 2001. Again, 
conditionality is very much part of the UK government’s thinking. The nine localized schemes 
established as part of the ‘Skills for Life’ strategy test the effectiveness of a variety of ‘carrot and stick’ 
approaches in persuading JSA claimants to learn basic skills. 
In Wearside, appropriate individuals are referred to a full-time basic education scheme and given 
£10 per week extra benefit for attending and £100 bonus for successful completion of the course. In 
contrast, some claimants in north Nottinghamshire/Leeds are not so lucky. Since 17 September 2001 the 
right to JSA of these claimants (aged 25–49) is subject to removal if they refuse, or give up, their 
allocated place on a basic educational skills programme. Initially benefit will be withheld for two weeks 
and this period will be doubled for a second ‘offence’ (Treolar 2001). The government has since rolled 
out the Skills for Life programme and integrated it into Jobcentre Plus. All JSA claimants, new dealers 
and inactive benefit applicants are now routinely screened to assess their basic literacy and numerical 
skills levels. Since April 2004, financial incentives have been introduced to encourage claimants to take 
up basic educational courses and enhance their chances of future employment. A second set of pilot 
studies to further consider the effectiveness of benefit sanctions has also been commissioned (DFES 
2004). The government has not ruled out the possibility of extending the use of sanctions to compel 
people to improve their basic skills in future – and this despite the fact that the Social Security Advisory 
Committee has previously stated its opposition to such measures (SSAC 2002). 
Finally, since 2001, under the community sentences sanctions policy offenders in receipt of JSA, 
income support (IS) and other specified training allowances who are in breach of the conditions of 
community punishment orders or community rehabilitation orders face benefit cuts (Knight et al. 2003). 
For those who live within four specified pilot areas, JSA can be removed entirely and IS reduced by up to 
40 per cent. Sanctions can last up to a maximum of four weeks. ‘The objective of the policy is to link the 
receipt of benefit more closely purpose to the fulfilment of responsibilities to society’ (Rowlinson 2004: 
120). It remains to be seen if this explicit linking of behavioural responsibilities and rights to benefit will 
become policy at a national level. 
Lone Parents 
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The issue of lone parenthood brings into stark relief the gendered tensions underlying policies which aim 
to get women into the PLM. Most lone parent families, the vast majority of which are headed by a 
woman, are especially susceptible to poverty. Whereas past policies may have helped to encourage a lack 
of paid work and entrenched dependency on welfare benefits, Lewis (1998) also points out that the new 
solution centred on paid employment may also be problematic. Citing evidence which suggests that most 
lone parents want to work once their child is established in primary school, Lister (1999) believes that it is 
right to use a variety of measures to encourage lone mothers into paid work, as potentially this provides 
them will the best route out of poverty. This approach, however, may undermine the social value of 
arguably, raising children is as valid and necessary a form of social contribution as paid work, and 
therefore should, when necessary, be supported by the state. The UK has been very liberal in enforcing 
paid work responsibilities on lone parents in the past, but as previous discussions indicate, the balance 
between the rights of lone mothers to draw on collective welfare provisions to support their family and 
their responsibility as individuals to provide for their family’s needs through paid work is currently being 
renegotiated. It is here, of course, that the impact of tax credit systems, popular in both the United States 
and the UK, is most noticeable. The logic behind the introduction of the working tax credit and childcare 
tax credit in April 2003 was precisely to make (low) paid work attractive to lone parents. In consequence, 
the informal care contribution of lone mothers may be rendered invisible and those who continue to draw 
welfare benefits rather than work are at risk of being labelled ‘partial’, dependent citizens (Burns 2000). 
For Hancock (2000) the devaluation of the informal care work of women has been central to the past 
marginalization of women, but under New Labour she argues that a significant shift has occurred. Where 
once the role of women was constructed primarily around their duties as ‘mothers/carers’, they are now 
viewed as ‘worker/citizens’. Lewis (2000) similarly argues that an ‘adult worker model’ rather than a 
male breadwinner/female carer approach is now central to contemporary policy. 
New Labour utilizes a similar, although perhaps less severe, approach in its attempt to increase the 
numbers of lone parents in paid employment. Although participants in the New Deal for Lone Parents 
(NDLP) are not yet compelled to seek work, the social welfare benefits available to lone parents are 
becoming more conditional. From April 2001 work-focused interviews (WFI) became compulsory for 
most lone parents claiming income support with children aged 13 years plus. In the period between 30 
April 2001 and 29 March 2002, 1531 lone parents were sanctioned for failing to attend the compulsory 
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interview without good cause (Hansard 2002). Since April 2003 all lone parents claiming income support 
have been required to attend a WFI. Coupled to this requirement, benefit entitlement for many lone 
parents may be conditional on a woman naming a child’s absent father under rules introduced under the 
Child Support Act 1991. More recently, the government has reiterated that lone parents have ‘a 
responsibility to engage more intensively with our employment advisers’ (DWP 2005a: 8). Whilst the 
government states that it would be inappropriate to extend the more stringent JSA-type regime, with an 
emphasis on sanctions for those who are not actively seeking work, a more rigorous approach appears to 
be part of future policy for lone parents with older children. A requirement for lone parents whose 
children attend secondary school to increase ‘work related activity’ under the guidance of a personal 
advisor is outlined in the latest proposals. In order to encourage participation, payment of a £20 per week 
‘work search premium’ will only be paid those lone parents who take part in the scheme (DWP 2005a). 
Furthermore, since October 2005 all lone parents with children aged 14 plus who are claiming out of 
work benefits are required to attend WFIs at three monthly intervals (Stanley, Asta Lohde and White 
2004). 
A number of studies have noted the positive effects of policies that encourage lone parents into the 
paid labour market, but simultaneously these studies have emphasized that the provision of quality 
support and education/training schemes, as well as help with childcare, are vitally important if lone 
parents are to enter paid employment in substantial numbers (Heron et al. 2002, Bradshaw 1996). By 
setting out less stringent requirements for the receipt of benefits by lone parents and in offering a package 
of advice, support and childcare through the NDLP, the government appears to endorse such findings. 
However, in making it clear that in future lone parents will be expected to enter the PLM, the government 
is implying that the contribution they make as informal carers outside the PLM is an inadequate basis on 
which to make a claim for public support (Gray 2001, Levitas 1998). 
Disabled People 
A key component of attempts to activate disabled people has been the New Deal for Disabled People 
(NDDP), established in 1998 extended nationally since 2001. Targeted at working-age recipients of 
incapacity benefit (IB) or severe disablement allowance, the NDDP aims to encourage disabled people 
into the PLM by offering benefit enhancements and personalized support whilst individuals make the 
transition from welfare to work (see Stafford 2003, 2005 for details). Although participation is voluntary, 
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and sanctions are not part of the NDDP, conditionality is increasingly seen as legitimate way of activating 
disabled people. 
In relation to disabled people, reforms introduced in the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act (1999) 
– strengthening the link between work and entitlement to incapacity benefit so that only those who have 
recently been in work and paid NI contributions are eligible; the application of the ‘all work test’ (now 
called the personal capability assessment, PCA); attendance at a work focused interview – can be seen as 
meeting the requirements of a cost-cutting government rather than meeting the needs of disabled people 
who do not work. The Prime Minister is keen to emphasize that the government’s strategy is focused on 
enabling (re)entry into the PLM whilst simultaneously recognizing the needs of those who are unable to 
work because of personal impairments. The stated aim is to return as many of the 2.7 million people 
currently in receipt of disability and incapacity benefits to the workforce as possible (Blair 2002). 
Faced with a situation whereby there are three times as many people of working age in receipt of 
more generous disability benefits than jobseeker’s allowance and disabled people account for 24 per cent 
of benefit expenditure (Walker 2003), the government signalled their intent to embark on radical reform 
of incapacity benefit (DWP 2005a, b; Johnson 2005). Building on the ‘Pathways to Work’ programme, 
which combined the ‘carrot’ of enhanced benefits and support with the ‘stick’ of benefit sanctions for 
those who failed to attend compulsory work-focused interviews (Stanley, Asta Lohde and White 2004), 
the most recent reforms will mean, 
more people will be required to attend a series of work focused interviews 
with a Personal Adviser, and those whose health problems are deemed less 
severe will also be required to participate in activity aimed at moving closer to 
work (Corden and Nice 2007: 566). 
Under changes included in the Welfare Reform Act (2007), the new ‘employment support 
allowance’ (ESA) will replace incapacity benefit and income support paid in relation to sickness or 
incapacity. During an initial 13 week, ‘assessment phase’, all new claimants will be paid a basic 
allowance at JSA rates and expected to undergo a revised PCA. If the PCA requirements are satisfied, the 
majority of claimants will be able to access the work-related activity element of ESA. However, receipt of 
this ‘employment support’ component (paid at a higher level than basic allowance) is conditional on 
clients drawing up individual return to work action plans, attending regular WFIs, and routinely 
undertaking ‘reasonable steps’ to manage their condition and/or accepting specified training or basic 
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skills support to facilitate their return to paid work. Refusal carries the threat of benefit sanctions and an 
enforced return to the lower basic assessment phase benefit. A small number of people who (following 
their PCA) are identified as having severe conditions and ‘limited capability for work-related activity’ 
will qualify for a ‘support component.’ This will be set at a higher level than the work-related activity 
element of ESA and such claimants will not need to participate in work-related activities (CPAG 2006, 
DWP 2007). 
Thornton (2005) has argued that the UK is rapidly moving towards a policy that blames disabled 
people for their lack of engagement with paid work and forgets that many are unable to work due to 
illness and impairment. The assumption that many of those in receipt of incapacity benefit are in reality 
capable of paid work underpins emergent policy and the government’s stated desire to undermine what it 
perceives to be the ‘sick note culture’ (Johnson 2005). The proposals ‘represent a significant extension of 
labour market conditionality for incapacitated claimants … [and] a further shift towards subjecting sick 
and disabled people to a workfare-style regime’ (Allirajah 2005: 4). Policy operates, therefore, more to 
discipline rather than enable disabled people. Ultimately, it may be more appropriate to view paid work as 
a goal, rather than a condition, of citizenship for disabled people. Sanctions remain inappropriate whilst, 
for many, suitable employment opportunities are lacking and widespread discrimination and significant 
structural/environmental barriers to paid work remain (Riddell, Banks and Wilson 2002, Howard 2004). 
Conditionality is firmly embedded at the core of New Labour’s emergent policy. In March 2007 
the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, John Hutton, re-endorsed the ‘fundamental principle of 
rights and responsibilities; of something for something’ and denounced condition-free systems of welfare 
as exclusive (Hutton 2007: 9). In a similar vein the Freud Report, established by the Secretary of State to 
review welfare reform progress to date and to consider further ways of reducing work inactivity in order 
to meet the government’s 80 per cent employment aspiration, recommended, 
maintaining the current regime for the unemployed, introducing stronger 
conditionality in line with Jobseeker’s Allowance for lone parents with 
progressively younger children, and moving to deliver conditionality for other 
groups (including people already on incapacity benefits) along the lines of 
Pathways to Work and the Employment and Support Allowance (Freud 2007: 
9). 
Making Work Pay or Activating the Irresponsible? 
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The 1.7 million people helped back into work by the New Deals during Labour’s first term of office 
should not to be dismissed lightly (Freud 2007: 2), if this is an accurate figure. However, other evidence 
is less positive about the impact of the government’s approach. Certain commentators have suggested that 
the New Deals may not be as successful as they at first appear and make strong arguments that industry 
and capital rather than unemployed people/lone parents are the real beneficiaries of the New Deals 
(Grover and Stewart 2000, Gray 2001, Prideaux 2001, 2005). Peck (2001) notes that job entry rates for 
the New Deal to March 2000 were modest, with overall only a third of participants leaving to enter paid 
work. He also argues that many of those who leave the New Deal become trapped in ‘contingent 
employment’ where they continually move from one short-term, low-paid, insecure job to another. The 
UK government’s own research also indicates some strong reservations about the effectiveness of its 
chosen approach. Only 27 per cent of companies participating in the ‘One’ scheme recruited lone parents 
to their workforce with even fewer (20 per cent) taking on the long-term unemployed. People with mental 
or physical impairments fared considerably worse2 (DSS 2001). The Adult Learning Inspectorate (a 
government agency) has also issued a damning appraisal of the New Deal for Young People. The 
recruitment figures noted for this scheme for the four years up to 2001 appear positive,3
Within the UK, the government remains committed to extending the linking of benefit entitlement to 
work-related conditions. It is a policy driven more by political conviction rather than hard evidence. For, 
as Treolar notes, ‘the impact [of conditionality
 but the report 
highlights some serious shortcomings. Sixty per cent of the training provided for young adults is 
condemned as inadequate. Similarly, although full-time education and training was the most popular 
option with recruits (40 per cent of 18–24 year olds), only 26 per cent of those participating got a job and 
31 per cent a qualification (ALI 2002). The aim is for all trainees to achieve both by the end of their one-
year course. 
4
                                                 
2 Eight per cent of participating employers recruited people with physical impairments, 5 per cent with mental 
impairments (DSS 2001). 
] on claimant attitude and behaviour is yet to become fully 
apparent’ (Treolar 2001: 3). Serious doubts about whether or not conditionality achieves its intended aim 
of activating reluctant workers have also been expressed in a wider context. Within the United States 
there is scant evidence of many durable success stories and workfare has had a limited long-term impact 
3 Of the four options available, 112,700 young people went into full-time education/training, 52,500 went into 
government-subsidized employment (60 per cent of whom went on to unsubsidized employment), 60,000 went into 
the voluntary sector and 56,000 joined the environment task force (ALI 2002). 
4 Our addition in brackets. 
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in shifting people from welfare into work (Peck and Theodore 2001). Widespread systematic appraisal of 
the schemes that have emerged within the European Union is lacking but Gallie argues that the limited 
evidence available suggests a ‘disappointingly small’ (Gallie 2002: 116) impact in helping participants 
maintain stable employment. 
Aside from questions related to the effectiveness of active welfare systems, a number of authors 
challenge the legitimacy of the imposition of conditionality by questioning the contractual principle used 
to defend ongoing reforms (see Goodin 2000, Dwyer 2000, 2004b, Standing 2002, Freedland and King 
2003, Dean et al. 2005). Dismissing arguments that people implicitly consent to a rewriting of the welfare 
contract that exists between the individual citizen and the state, they note that this argument falls down on 
two levels. At the client–caseworker level such contracts are one-sided. In effect the coercion/compulsion 
of the user is couched as ‘consent’. Consent implies choice and, given that people have real needs for 
their benefits, this element is missing from the process. As Standing (cited by Dean et al. 2005: 20) 
argues, ‘dignified work can only evolve if ordinary people have the capacity to say no’ – and many 
unemployed people in the UK lack that capacity. As the active welfare state evolves, it is increasingly 
likely that other ‘inactive’ individuals, such as lone parents and certain disabled people, will find their 
ability to access welfare benefits curtailed in the future. The supposed aim of enabling poorer citizens by 
making work pay is often secondary to the implicit rationale that underpins activation: that governments 
are 
dealing with calculating citizens who need to be disciplined rather than 
empowered, whose conduct needs to be supervised rather than liberated and 
whose responsibilities and obligations should be strengthened (van Berkel and 
van der Aa 2005: 341–2). 
Beyond the UK: a Drift towards the Active World of Workfare? 
The emergence of conditionality is not limited to the UK; indeed, the policy changes outlined in this 
paper have a much wider resonance. In the new, active world of twenty-first-century welfare, imposing 
work-related responsibilities for all is seen as a panacea for the problems of passivity/welfare 
dependency. Increasingly they inform policy in many states across Europe (Van Oorschot 2000, Lødemel 
and Trickey 2001, Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004), in the United States (O’Connor 1998, 
Prideaux 2001, Deacon 2002), in Australia and elsewhere (Goodin 2002, McDonald and Marston 2005). 
In effect, a move towards social policies that combine coercive paternalism and conditional entitlement to 
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reduce the rights of vulnerable citizens is underway in many Western welfare states (Dwyer 2004b). At 
supranational level the mantra of conditional, active welfare, that social rights come with attendant 
responsibilities, finds expression in European Union policy, particularly in the guise of the European 
Employment Strategy (Peck and Theodore 2000, Wincott 2003, Dean et al. 2005, van Berkel and van der 
Aa 2005). Likewise, the OECD supports conditionality and argues in favour of access to disability 
benefits being ‘conditional on participation in paid work, rehabilitation schemes and other integration 
measures’ (Marin, Prinz. and Queisser 2004: 26). 
A number of scholars, however, would argue that it is over-simplistic to equate the reforms in the 
UK with policies that have emerged across Europe. Levy (2004) distinguishes between ‘thick’, or ‘human 
capital’, and ‘thin’, or ‘work first’, approaches to labour market activation. Both share the same ultimate 
goals of reducing formal unemployment, whilst simultaneously looking to reinsert other ‘inactive’ 
citizens into the PLM, but use different means to achieve their ends. ‘Thin’ activation policies, such as 
those pursued in the United States, attribute inactivity in the PLM to personal failings and the existence of 
overgenerous, ‘passive’ welfare benefits. They are characterized by a ‘work-first’ (Peck and Theodore 
2000) stance, which places the onus on individuals to take offers of employment irrespective of wage 
levels or their domestic circumstances. In contrast, policy in certain EU countries, Sweden being an 
obvious example, follows a human capital or ‘thick’ approach to activation. In this version of what may 
be labelled the ‘new social liberalism’, an enabling state is concerned with enhancing the skills of 
marginalized individuals and providing them with high-quality employment opportunities rather than 
merely removing them from the welfare rolls. Levy argues that ‘thick’ activation ‘demands much more of 
the state as well as the individual’ (Levy 2004: 190) in that a substantial financial commitment is required 
on the part of government to fund extensive educational/training and employment opportunities. A similar 
analysis that differentiates between ‘liberal’ and ‘universalistic’ activation policies in European welfare 
states has been offered by Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer (2004), while Lødemel suggests that two very 
different welfare experiments are taking place on either side of Atlantic. In Europe he contends that 
reform is primarily about a move away from unconditional welfare, whereas policy in the United States 
combines an end to welfare entitlement with ‘an accompanying emphasis on hassle rather than help’ 
(2001: 335). As discussed below, however, what distinguishes U.S.-style policies from their human 
capital counterparts is not simply ‘hassle’ but the unremitting preoccupation with – literally – work first. 
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This effective privileging of market capacity not only discriminates against necessary but unpaid work 
but, in doing so, also disadvantages women and minority ethnic groups, neither of which occupy secure 
positions in the capitalist labour market. 
Judging from the above, differences in approach to activation/workfare type policies clearly exist 
both within and beyond Europe. However, it is argued here that, in spite of the various combinations of 
incentive and sanction that currently operate in different national settings as conditionality becomes a 
foundational principle of the new welfare settlement, important changes in the normative and legal 
foundations of welfare states are taking place. Their impact on social policy is being felt most keenly by 
those on the margins of social citizenship to the point where citizenship itself is effectively ‘conditional’ 
for the most vulnerable social groups (Dwyer 1998, Lødemel and Trickey 2001). The consequences of 
this shift to active welfare should not be dismissed lightly. Although Pierson (1996, 2001) has argued that 
mature welfare states are resilient, path-dependent institutions, which are often resistant to retrenchment, 
it is nevertheless the case that path-dependent behaviour among defenders of the welfare state, 
particularly but not exclusively in liberal regimes, is weakening. Consequently, the weakest groups, 
which frequently have only the much-diminished institutions of organized labour to support them (Ellison 
2006), are vulnerable to sustained efforts on the part of governments to recalibrate welfare as ‘activation’. 
So a qualitative shift is ongoing within many welfare states: ending the right to welfare was central to 
U.S. welfare reform in the mid-1990s (Deacon 2002), while terminating unconditional entitlement for 
many outside the PLM is becoming a central feature of welfare reform across and beyond the EU. 
Conclusions 
This chapter illustrates several important points. First, in the UK, New Labour has travelled a significant 
ideological distance in a relatively short time. Less than a decade ago the Labour Party was opposed to 
workfare-type unemployment schemes, although today such schemes are central aspects of policy. Their 
implementation signals a ‘a fundamental shift in the aims of policy making and the introduction of a new 
policy paradigm’ (Wright, Kopač and Slater 2004) within the UK employment/unemployment strategy. 
Having accepted their predecessors’ narrow definition of welfare dependency, New Labour has extended 
the use of compulsion and benefit sanctions within the British welfare state. Second, conditionality lays 
bare some of an inherent contradictions at the heart of the New Labour’s welfare project. It is a stated aim 
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of the present administration to challenge welfare dependency, but as Grover and Stewart (2000: 248) 
note, only certain types of dependency are deemed to be problematic. 
Obviously, for Labour’s true believers having a job which only exists because 
of some scheme or subsidy, and using subsidised nursery places for one’s 
children, is not part of benefit dependency, whereas looking after one’s own 
children at home on benefit is dependency. 
New Labour’s attempt to ‘activate’ large numbers of unemployed people, disabled people and lone 
parents demonstrates the extent to which these groups are now conceptualized as undeserving welfare 
dependants unless they buy into the new work-first welfare contract that is on offer (Trickey and Walker 
2001). 
Third, New Labour’s ‘make work pay’ strategy might not be the answer for many who still remain 
outside the paid labour market. The government’s combination of activation and increased support has 
improved the financial position of some poorer people who engage in paid work. However, whilst the 
number of those registered as formally unemployed has diminished, overall levels of economic inactivity 
for people of working age have barely altered from 21.6 per cent in 1994 to 21.4 per cent in 2002. There 
is certainly evidence from a number of European commentators that active labour market policies are not 
quite the panacea that policy makers hope (Martin 1998, Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström 2002). Of 
course, it is clearly the case that informal familial care responsibilities continue to restrict the ability of 
many women to take up paid work and levels of disability remain the main reason for male absence from 
the PLM (Taylor-Gooby,  Larsen and Kananen 2004). 
Fourth, the UK legislation and initiatives outlined in this paper are clearly part of a wider, ongoing 
shift towards activation as increasingly the dominant understanding of ‘welfare’. Regardless of the 
precise label (conditionality, activation, workfare, welfare-to-work), and whether or not a policy best fits 
a ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ classification, rights are becoming progressively more conditional upon an individual’s 
acceptance of work-focused responsibilities. This ‘creeping conditionality’ (Dwyer 2004b) represents a 
significant qualitative shift away from the public welfare envisaged in the PWWS, built around notions of 
need and entitlement. It should also be noted that the policy changes discussed in this chapter are 
illustrative of a broader and substantial shift in the principles that underpin the provision of social benefits 
(Cox 1998, Taylor-Gooby 2002). 
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As an adjunct to this qualitative shift away from ‘social protection’, it is worth briefly considering 
a fifth, more speculative, point that follows from those discussed so far. In addition to the analysis 
presented here, it could be argued that conditionality is not only a point of policy but also a particular 
means of social control that ‘encourages’ individuals to ‘govern themselves’ in what are becoming 
increasingly individualized welfare systems. Ferge’s (1997: 23) contention about the ‘individualization of 
the social’ – the withdrawal of social commitments and ‘the rejection of the importance of an integrated 
society’ – chimes with the notion of ‘DIY social policy’ developed by Klein and Millar (1995) to produce 
a notion of ‘dual conditionality’. On one level, state policies (whether thick or thin), work to ‘encourage’ 
individuals to be ‘active’, while simultaneously pushing responsibility for activity onto individuals 
themselves. On another level, however, because the unemployed and other vulnerable groups are either 
forced, or strongly encouraged, to participate in job search activities, including interview training, job 
placements and so on, there is a sense not just of conditionality but of ‘self-conditioning’ as perceptions 
about the necessity of work – and the individual’s responsibility not only to find work but to have a life 
shaped by work – become embedded and ultimately ‘assumed’. Over time, assumptions are 
institutionalized and so become an integral part of a new consensus about work and welfare. 
If we are to challenge the prospect of this ‘new welfare institutionalism’ and ensure a truly 
inclusive new welfare settlement in the twenty-first century, two issues need to be addressed. First, the 
validity of different forms of social contribution beyond activity in the PLM, particularly unpaid care 
work within a familial setting (Levitas 1998, Lewis 1998, Williams 2001) needs to be properly 
recognized. Second, the right to adequate welfare for those who are unable to engage in paid work due to 
sickness or impairment must be ensured. The danger, of course, is that over time the residualization of 
social rights as part of the ongoing shift towards ‘active’ welfare states will become ‘normal’ as the new 
institutional welfare consensus becomes ever further embedded. With social citizenship effectively 
redefined, welfare is no longer about an optimum level of support but rather about individuals’ capacity to 
fashion ‘their’ own welfare provision in an increasingly conditional and conditioning social policy 
environment (Dwyer 1998, 2004a, Lister 2002, Ellison 2006). 
 
